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John Hardman Moore outlines 
his joint research with Oliver Hart, 
looking at the economics of power 
and control and the foundations 
of contractual incompleteness.
Hart and Moore (HM) have returned to the primitive questions:  What is a 
contract?  Why do people 
write (long-term) contracts?  
The classical view held by 
economists and lawyers is that 
a contract provides parties with 
a set of rights and obligations, 
and that these rights and 
obligations are useful, among 
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which causes a deadweight 
loss.  One way the parties can 
reduce this deadweight loss 
is for them to write an ex ante 
contract that pins down future 
outcomes very precisely, and that 
therefore leaves little room for 
disagreement and aggrievement.  
The drawback of such a contract 
is that it does not allow the parties 
to adjust the outcome to the state 
of the world.  HM study the trade-
off between rigidity and flexibility.  
Their analysis provides a basis 
other things, to encourage long-
term investments.  HM provide an 
alternative, and complementary, 
view.  They argue that a contract 
provides a reference point for 
the parties’ trading relationship: 
more precisely for their feelings 
of entitlement.  HM develop a 
model in which a party’s ex post 
performance depends on whether 
the party gets what he is entitled 
to relative to the outcomes 
permitted by the contract.  A 
party who is shortchanged 
shades on performance, 
Another Focus Paper outlines John Hardman Moore’s research 
with Nobu Kiyotaki on the macroeconomic questions to do with 
the nature of money and liquidity, and the interplay between the 
financial system and the aggregate economy. 
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for long-term contracts that don’t specify details and 
throws light on why simple “employment” contracts 
can be optimal.
In related research, Hart and Moore introduced what they believe is a new way of thinking about 
contracts.  Their idea is that, in an interesting class 
of cases, the role of a contract is to constrain or 
circumscribe what people bargain about later, rather 
than to specify a particular outcome or mechanism 
for determining that outcome.  To put it another way, 
a contract is an agreement to agree: an agreement 
to bargain about some things in the future, but not 
others.  The advantage of thinking about a contract 
this way is that it allows HM to explain why parties 
restrict their choices, e.g., by taking money off the 
table.  The reason is that sometimes less is more: 
having less to bargain about ex post can increase ex 
ante efficiency.  
contractual 
incompleteness
Hart and Moore have also written on the design of hierarchies.  Suppose that a 
decision must be made in an organization. The 
organization might represent a private firm, a 
public firm or even society. If two individuals 
clash over the decision, who gets his or her 
way?  In many cases, the answer is that it 
depends on who is senior in the organization.  
That is, there is a hierarchy of individuals with 
respect to any decision. In the event of a conflict, 
the decision will be taken by the most senior 
person in the hierarchy who cares about 
– or has a view about – this particular 
decision. 
In HM’s model of hierarchies, people have 
ideas about asset usage, but these ideas 
conflict, i.e., only one person’s idea can be 
implemented with respect to any one asset. 
HM use their model to analyse the optimal 
hierarchical structure given that different 
agents have different tasks; in particular, 
some agents are engaged in coordination 
and others in specialization. Inter alia, their 
theory explains why coordinators should 
typically be senior to specialists, and why 
pyramidal hierarchies may be optimal. Their 
theory also throws light on the optimal degree 
of decentralization inside a firm and on the 
boundaries of the firm.
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